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Abstract:  This paper identifies and explains systematic performance differences between 
younger and older democracies:  younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of 
law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality and lower secondary school enrollment; and spend 
more on public investment and government workers.  One explanation for this is that 
politicians in young democracies are less credible.  Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) argue that the 
inability of political competitors to make credible promises to citizens leads them to 
underprovide public goods, overprovide transfers to narrow groups of voters, and engage in 
excessive rent-seeking.   A variety of tests suggest that this is the only theory that explains 
the performance of young democracies.  The effect of democratic age remains large even 
after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, 
that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or 
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Many democracies fall short of many autocracies in the provision of public services 
or the protection of economic or human rights.  Recent contributions to the literature on 
democracy underline how puzzling this is.  Acemoglu, et al. (2002) and others, for example, 
argue that universal suffrage, competitive elections and restraints on the executive branch 
should have a profound effect on the security of property rights.  Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2002) argue that the expansion of the franchise should open the way to wider access to 
education.  The evidence, though, indicates that the mere fact of elections and political 
checks and balances seems to guarantee little in terms of government performance, just as a 
large literature finds little or no relationship between democracy and economic growth.   
A natural explanation for uneven democratic performance is the extreme 
heterogeneity of democracies.  Which precise aspect of heterogeneity that matters most for 
government performance is still not clear, however.  Indeed, even defining the dimensions 
of heterogeneity has proven difficult.  For example, classic contributions from an older 
literature (e.g., Huntington 1971) argue that democracies differ significantly in the extent to 
which they are “politically institutionalized.” This term resists easy operationalization.   
The argument and evidence in this paper point to two key characteristics of 
democracies that explain performance disparities among democracies:  their age and the 
ability of political competitors to make credible promises to voters.  The findings below are 
the first to demonstrate that young democracies perform systematically differently than older 
democracies across a range of policy areas, from corruption controls to government   2 
ownership of newspapers to secondary school enrollment.  The important question, 
however, is why this is so.  The analysis below supports a new explanation:  the relative 
inability of politicians in younger democracies to make credible promises to voters prior to 
elections explains the precise differences in policy choices of politicians in younger and older 
democracies.   
Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) argue that political competitors who are unable to make 
credible promises to most voters will, upon taking office, underprovide public goods, over-
spend on transfers to narrow groups, and engage in significant rent-seeking.  That is, the 
behavior of such politicians can be characterized as highly clientelist.  However, politicians in 
older democracies have had greater opportunity than their counterparts in younger 
democracies precisely to build up policy reputations across a wide swath of the electorate.  
To the extent that credibility and age of democracy are related, though, younger democracies 
should exhibit the same behavior – under-provision of public goods, over-spending on 
transfers to narrow groups of citizens and high rent-seeking – predicted to emerge in 
countries where politicians are credible to only limited numbers of voters.   
In fact, the tests below, across seven policy dimensions, reveal that younger 
democracies exhibit precisely this behavior.  This finding is robust to numerous 
specifications, including political and electoral institutions, levels of voter information, ethnic 
fractionalization and the potential conflating influence of democratically-elected leaders who 
exhibit long tenures.  Moreover, evidence presented below suggests that one common 
measure of voter information, newspaper circulation, may in fact reflect in large measure the 
underlying credibility of political promises to citizens.  This suggests a potential alternative or 
complementary interpretation of studies that have linked higher newspaper circulation to 
such outcomes as low corruption (e.g., Adserà, et al. 2003).     3 
The credibility of pre-electoral promises and government performance 
The extreme heterogeneity of democratic performance is easily demonstrated.  The 
rule of law in half of all countries exhibiting either checks and balances or competitive 
elections in the 1990s was the same or worse as in the median country lacking either one or 
the other.1  Comparisons using corruption indicators yield similar results, as do comparisons 
using objective indicators of performance.  More than 20 percent of countries exhibiting 
strong checks and balances and competitive elections exhibit worse gross secondary school 
enrollment than the median country that does not.  Lindert (2003) documents this as well, 
showing that “full” democracies are more likely than “elite” democracies to provide primary 
education.  Baum and Lake (2003) find no relationship between democracy and female 
secondary school enrollment.  The sources of this varied performance remain a continuing 
puzzle of growing importance, since the number of countries holding competitive elections 
has doubled, from 53 to 101 between 1985 and 2000, and the number exhibiting some 
checks and balances has risen from 62 to 112.2   
What explains the heterogeneity of democratic performance?  Keefer and Vlaicu 
(2004) point to the credibility of pre-electoral political promises.  Most models assume either 
that all pre-electoral promises are credible to all voters, or none are (see Persson and 
Tabellini 2000 for a review).  There are, however, scarcely any democracies in which these 
polar cases apply.  Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) argue that when political competitors are less 
able to make credible promises to voters regarding public good provision and economic 
performance generally, they attempt either to build their credibility among smaller groups of 
                                                   
1 The rule of law measure is from Political Risk Services’  International Country Risk Guide and the measures of 
checks and balances and competitive elections from the Database on Political Institutions.  These are discussed 
below.  
2 Based on World Development Indicators PPP adjusted income per capita, and using the Database on 
Political Institutions variables Executive Index of Electoral Competition (EIEC) and Legislative Index of Electoral 
Competition (LIEC), and Tenure of System (tensys) which are explained in more detail below.     4 
voters or to rely on patrons who, in turn, can make credible promises to clients.  Either 
strategy influences the policy making incentives of politicians.  Specifically, in low-credibility 
countries – where politicians are reliant on patrons or have succeeded in establishing credible 
relationships with a few voters – politicians focus on government policies that benefit small, 
targeted groups of voters, give shorter shrift to public good provision (policies that benefit 
voters as a whole) and are more free to engage in rent-seeking.   
The effort of non-credible politicians to establish credibility with small groups of 
voters mirrors the well-documented relationship in the literature between patrons and 
clients.  Scholars who have closely studied patron-client relationships in the field have found 
that they are personalized, on-going and reciprocal – characteristics sufficient for 
reputational equilibria to exist in a non-cooperative game.  For example, Scott (1972, 92) 
characterizes patron-client relations in Southeast Asia as ones “in which an individual of 
higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide 
protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, 
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the 
patron.”  The analysis here explains why clientelism at the social and local levels enters 
politics at higher levels:  the credibility of patrons with respect to clients makes patrons 
valuable allies of political competitors.  However, since patrons only value public policies 
that transfer benefits to their clients, political reliance on patrons also leads non-credible 
politicians to underprovide public goods.3   
The implications for young democracies are immediate.  Political competitors in 
younger democracies have had less chance to develop policy reputations with voters and 
                                                   
3 Patron preferences here are related to a generic problem in political economy.  When politicians have narrow 
constituencies, it is easier for constituents to give credit to politicians for public services that the constituents 
and no one else receives than for public services that benefit all citizens and that many politicians could have 
had a role in providing (e.g., Mayhew 1974).       5 
their political parties are likely to be less well-established as vehicles for conveying credible 
policy stances.  As a consequence, they should be more susceptible to reliance on patrons as 
a means to establish credible bonds with voters.  This implies that the policy choices of 
young democracies should resemble most closely those predicted by the foregoing 
arguments:  lower levels of public good provision, high levels of private, targeted goods, and 
high rent-seeking.  It is this hypothesis that is the subject of the empirical analysis below. 
Qualitative evidence for the pervasiveness of clientelism in young democracies 
The conclusion that political competitors in young democracies are less credible, 
more reliant on patrons, and more likely to focus public policy on transfers and rent-seeking 
than broad public good provision finds substantial implicit support in the case study 
literature.  Various contributors in Malloy and Seligson (1987), looking at countries 
experiencing the transition from authoritarian to democratic government, repeatedly note 
the reliance of new political competitors on narrow benefits to targeted constituencies.  
Conaghan, for example, characterizes the parties of the young Ecuadoran democracy as 
fundamentally clientelist (p. 157), and Rosenberg describes political decision making in 
young Central American democracies as personalized and based on vertical patronage 
networks (p. 197). The democratic regime that succeeded the authoritarian government of 
Getulio Vargas in post-World War II Brazil was itself soon replaced in 1964 by the military.  
One of the military’s purported aims in replacing this young democracy was to create the 
conditions for the introduction of a “clean democracy,” one in which the citizenry were free 
of clientelist ties to political bosses and where rural voters were not controlled by country 
bosses (Duncan Baretta and Markoff, 53).   
Sayari (1977) writes that in the early years of Turkish democracy in the 1940s, “party 
strategies for peasant mobilization were based largely on the recruitment of notables into   6 
party ranks who were then entrusted with the task of providing ‘ready vote banks’. . .This 
strategy met a favourable resopnse from the notables since assuming the leadership post of a 
party’s local unit meant that a notable could (a) gain additional status and prestige vis-à-vis 
rival notables, (b) secure new sources of outside support for members of his faction, and (c) 
maintain and improve his economic standing through party ties.” (p. 107).  These notables 
were the at the heads of extended clientelist networks.  Sayari notes the importance to parties 
of providing individualized assistance:  first, in navigating the bureaucracy (which are 
“relayed to local party leaders or deputies”, 108) and, second, in the provision of public 
investment for rural development projects (108).    
Policy variables that capture differences between young and old democracies 
More systematic empirical evidence also supports the claim that politicians in 
younger democracies prefer transfers to narrow groups of voters, engage in greater rent-
seeking and underprovide public goods.  Seven variables are used here to represent these 
different dimensions of government policy.  A common measure of corruption captures 
rent-seeking tendencies; measures of bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, secondary school 
enrollment and government ownership of newspapers are employed to track government 
incentives to provide public goods or goods that are difficult to target to particular groups of 
voters; and public investment and the central government wage bill are used to capture 
policies that are easy for politicians to target to specific voters at the expense of voters 
generally.  Each of these is explained in greater detail below.   
Measuring rent-seeking:  Corruption 
Rent-seeking – the diversion of economic resources to the private requirements of 
political decision makers – is a key measure of government incentives to satisfy broad social 
interests.  Measures of corruption are the most-used proxies for rent-seeking.  One that has   7 
been used in a number of articles (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995) and that, uniquely, has 
ample country and year coverage, is the corruption indicator from Political Risk Service’s 
International Country Risk Guide.  This is a subjective measure of the extent to which bribes are 
a significant determinant of government decision making.  The measure has broad country 
coverage, and is available since 1986.  All of the Political Risk Service variables are scaled so 
that higher values are “better”.  Hence, higher values of the corruption variable signify 
reductions in corruption.   
Measuring public or non-targeted good provision:  The rule of law and the quality of 
bureaucracy 
The rule of law is easily seen as a consequence of government incentives to respond 
to broad or narrow interests in society.4  When the rule of law prevails, the umbrella of 
secure property, contractual and other rights extends over all citizens.  The benefits of the 
rule of law – faster growth, for example – similarly extend to all citizens.  However, when 
special interests (including politicians themselves) can use the power of government to 
abrogate the government’s obligations to average citizens – for example, to protect the 
property or contractual rights of average citizens – the rule of law is weak.5  The costs of 
weak rule of law are borne by citizens in general.  Government protection of property and 
contract rights can therefore be seen as a policy that has public good characteristics and is 
not easily targeted to particular groups of citizens.  The rule of law measure from Political 
Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide is a common measure of the extent of 
                                                   
4 The literature (North and Weingast 1989, Acemoglu, et al. 2002, Clague, et al. 1996) more typically argues 
that secure property and contractual rights are the product of political checks and balances that create 
institutional road blocks to government efforts to expropriate.  Empirically, however, political checks and 
balances are weak predictors of the property rights measures used here.  The divergent incentives of politicians 
to pursue broad public interests, the core problem in the analysis here, explains why checks and balances may 
not always be a strong guarantee of the security of property rights. 
5 This definition of rule of law is not the only one.  However, the specifics of the definition fit squarely in any 
definition, and are tracked by the Political Risk Services rule of law indicator.     8 
government credibility and its willingness to respect property rights of individuals (see, e.g., 
Knack and Keefer 1995 and Acemoglu, et al. 2002, Clague, et al. 1996).    
High bureaucratic quality is another government policy with public good 
characteristics.  Lower bureaucratic quality implies that the quality of public services offered 
generally by government to the average citizen is low, and that the average citizen confronts 
more obstacles to doing business with government.  At the same time, those obstacles can 
always be eliminated for favored constituents of the government.  Hence, bureaucratic 
quality is a useful indicator of the tradeoff that governments make between the pursuit of 
general and private interests.  It can, again, be measured using the eponymous variable from 
Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide.   
Measuring public or non-targeted good provision:  secondary school enrollment  
These measures of public or non-targeted good provision are subjective.  The best 
objective measure would be one that quantified government spending on public or non-
targeted goods.  Unfortunately, even when we can identify categories of government 
spending that appear to be untargeted or dedicated to public good provision, the actual 
destination of these funds is often targeted.  For example, education spending can be aimed 
at raising achievement for all children (through curriculum reforms, testing, spending on 
high quality teachers); or it can be targeted (by building new schools in some areas, but not 
in others).  Cross-country budget data on education do not distinguish which.    
To circumvent this difficulty, an outcome indicator, secondary school enrollment, is 
used below to approximate the extent to which the public component of education spending 
predominates.6  If politicians care relatively more about political targeting than they do about 
                                                   
6 Primary school enrollment could, in principle, also be used, but most countries send most of their children to 
primary school  The coefficient of variation in the sample used here is 17.6 percent for primary school 
enrollment, and 50.8 percent for secondary school enrollment.     9 
providing the public good of quality education to all children, the overall quality of schooling 
should suffer.  For example, they might locate schools or hire teachers based on criteria 
other than the educational payoff to those decisions.  As quality falls, families should 
demonstrate increasing reluctance to incur the financial and opportunity costs of sending 
their children to secondary school and secondary school enrollment should fall.   
Confidence in the validity of secondary school enrollment as a proxy for public good 
provision should be high if it is the case that the relationship between (targetable) spending 
and learning outcomes is low, if the relationship between (non-targetable) education reforms 
and learning is high, and if learning outcomes are correlated with family decision to enroll 
children.  The existing evidence is generally supportive of these relationships.   
A large fraction of education spending goes to teachers.  The evidence suggests little 
clear relationship between teacher spending and learning quality, however.  First, teacher 
absenteeism is a notorious problem in developing country education systems and has been 
strongly associated with student absenteeism (see Ehrenberg, et al. 1991 on the United 
States; Carlson 2000 on Chile, and Harber 1989 on Nigeria).  Student absenteeism is 
obviously an indication of low learning.  It is also particularly relevant for the analysis here, 
where student enrollment is the variable of interest.  Second, teacher quality seems more 
closely related to turnover of teachers and the prevalence of first year teachers (education 
management policies that are difficult to target) than to teacher compensation (Hanushek, et 
al. 2005).  In sum, teacher compensation can be high, but if it is meant only to benefit 
teachers as a political constituency and if there is little incentive to improve education 
outcomes, compensation does not lead to higher teacher attendance or quality.   
Additional evidence underlines the positive effects on learning of (relatively cheap) 
management reforms, which do not target resources to specific narrow constituences.    10 
Looking at four Francophone countries, Michaelowa (2001) finds that a visit by a school 
inspector in the past year increased scores.  On the other hand, teacher absenteeism 
substantially reduces student performance (math/French) for fifth graders, as did whether a 
teacher was a civil servant or a union member (both of which are indicators of the degree of 
teachers’ ability to act collectively in their private interests).  Moreover, these negative 
influences on learning more than offset the positive effects on learning associated with the 
presence of textbooks or the literacy of a child’s parents.7   
Even when the relationship between additional physical inputs and enrollment or 
educational achievement has been shown to be positive, the magnitude of the effect is small 
(see, e.g., Michaelowa 2001 and Glewwe and Jacoby 1994 on blackboards in four 
Francophone African countries and Ghana, respectively; and Harbison and Hanushek for a 
broad review).  Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) only find a significant effect of the physical 
condition of classrooms on student testing, but condition is related to maintenance 
expenditures, which are precisely the types of government spending that are difficult for 
politicians to target (it is difficult for a politician to get credit for the repair of a door or 
window compared to the construction of a new school).   
Taken together, this evidence shows that a focus on quality or on systems that 
influence outcomes across schools, neither of which is easy for politicians to target to 
particular constituencies, are critical to learning, but financial inputs into education are less 
clearly associated with learning.  However, is low learning, the unobservable public good in 
cross-country analysis, associated with low enrollment, the variable that can be observed?  
Here there is less evidence, but it supports the contention that low learning environments 
                                                   
7 Ballou (1996) also concludes that a good academic record does little to boost an applicant’s chances to be 
hired as a teacher in the United States and argues that this is because administrator incentives are too weakly 
linked to classroom performance and student achievement to persuade them to place weight on a candidate’s 
academic success, even when this is associated with better classroom performance.   11 
drive down enrollment.  One piece of evidence is reported above:  teacher and student 
absenteeism move together.  Bommier and Lambert (2000) find, in addition, that students 
enroll earlier in Tanzanian schools where school quality is higher.  In the estimations below, 
therefore, gross secondary school enrollment, from World Development Indicators, is taken as an 
indicator of incentives to provide public rather than private and targetable goods.   
Measuring public or non-targeted good provision:  government ownership of 
newspapers 
The final indicator of public good provision is related to government policy towards 
citizen information.  Since citizen information is a public good, government policies that 
expand or restrict citizen access to information should be influenced by the same forces that 
drive public good provision more generally – including the credibility of political promises.  
One such policy is the market share of government-owned newspapers as a fraction of the 
market share of the top five newspapers in a country, collected by Djankov, et al. (2003).  
Where the market share of government newspapers is high, citizens have less access to a 
diversity of information sources.  Elected governments can more easily deny citizens this 
public good if public goods are not electorally relevant, as when political competitors cannot 
make credible promises to a large fraction of citizens. 
It may of course also be true that elected governments with no intention of 
surrendering power might also foreclose citizen access to information.  Such a government 
would pass from the category of “competitively elected”, eventually, when it suppressed an 
election or won an election with a large super-majority, to the non-competitively elected 
category, creating an association, by definition, between government ownership and the 
continuous years of elections.  In this case, however, the highest government share of the 
newspaper market should be found where elected leaders have the longest tenure.  There is, 
in fact, a strongly positive relationship between the tenure of elected executives and the   12 
market share of government-owned newspapers.  However, evidence reported below shows 
that the negative effect of continuous years of competitive elections on government market 
share is robust to controls for leader tenure.   
Government-owned newspapers might also be seen as a way to increase  the flow of 
information to citizens, for example if they are heavily subsidized and distributed below cost.  
There seem to be few examples where government newspapers are set up and managed for 
the purpose of providing unbiased information about, for example, the performance of 
elected officials.  However, to the extent that this is true in some cases, estimates below will 
be biased towards rejecting the hypothesis that political credibility reduces government 
restrictions on citizen information.  
Measuring targeted government spending:  Public  investment and the government 
wage bill 
Government employment and public investment or infrastructure spending are 
traditional ways for governments to target benefits to particular constituencies.  This is 
straightforward to see in the case of patronage in government employment, which benefits 
job holders and their families.  The government wage bill as a fraction of GDP, taken (like 
public investment) from Government Financial Statistics, tracks government spending on jobs 
and therefore offers a measure of government incentives to channel spending to targeted 
constituencies.   
The fraction of society that benefits from a given public investment is more variable 
than jobs spending.  Like education spending, public investment has both public good and 
targetable, private components.  The key characteristic of public investment is not that its 
benefits are entirely private and targeted, but that relative to other categories of public 
spending, politicians can target a higher fraction of public investment undertaken every year.  
Most education spending, for example, is on teachers and other administrative staff.  On the   13 
margin, politicians can influence which teachers are hired or where they are posted, but most 
teachers and postings are fixed from year to year.  Public investment spending, on the other 
hand, disproportionately consists of new construction that benefits particular constituencies.  
Given the characteristics of public investment, politicians interested in providing narrowly 
targeted services to constituents should therefore be disproportionately interested in 
increasing public investment.  In fact, as the phrase “pork barrel spending”  recalls, political 
preferences for targetable public investment spending are well-known.  Public investment 
spending as a fraction of GDP is therefore used here as a measure of government incentives 
to target public spending to specific constituencies. 
Explaining differences between young and old democracies 
The key concern here is to assess whether the age of democracy explains variation in 
policy choices across democracies.  Numerous alternative hypotheses regarding policy 
variation must also be taken into account, however.  This section describes the age of 
democracy variable and the other controls that enter into the econometric specifications 
analyzed below.   
Measuring the age of democracy  
The puzzle explored in this paper is why the institution of competitive elections, a 
defining characteristic of democracies, yields sharply different outcomes across countries.  In 
constructing a measure of the age of democracy, therefore, the core democracy variable is 
based on the seven-point Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competition (LIEC 
and EIEC) from the Database on Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2002).  These variables are 
objective and narrow, excluding, unlike other measures of democracy, either other 
institutional features of countries (the presence of checks and balances) or outcomes   14 
(whether governments are constrained by formal institutions, or whether elections have led 
to the replacement of an incumbent by a challenger).   
The highest score on each of these two indices (seven) is assigned to countries in 
which multiple parties compete in legislative and executive elections and no party receives 
more than 75 percent of the vote.  In all of the discussion here, the continuous years of 
competitive elections are measured as the number of consecutive years in which a country 
has the highest score on both indices.  From 1975 – 2000, the period under study here, the 
median number of years of continuous elections is eleven and the mean 27 among countries 
that have ever held competitive elections.8   
Other control variables 
Other geographic and demographic features of countries are likely to have a direct 
effect on the kinds of policies that citizens demand or that have the highest payoff for 
citizens.  Country land area and population capture the demand for public infrastructure, 
since the demand for roads or the costs of providing education or ensuring the rule of law 
are surely different in large, sparsely populated than in small, densely populated countries.  
Countries with a larger fraction of young people should exhibit a greater demand for 
education.  More young people may also increase the pressure on politicians to provide jobs 
and raise the costs of maintaining the rule of law, in view of the well-known association 
between youth and crime.  There may be economies (or diseconomies) in the application of 
policies across a larger population; hence, total population is taken into account. 
                                                   
8 DPI begins in 1975.  To establish the number of continuous years of democracy in 1974, the “age of 
democracy” variable from Clague, et al. (1996) is employed.  Their methodology truncates the age of the oldest 
democracies, so the maximum continuous years of elections in the year 2000 in the analysis below is therefore 
70, attained by 19 countries.     15 
Finally, the demand for, and the costs of providing, infrastructure, education or even the rule 
of law and integrity in government may differ substantially across rural and urban areas.  
These are all taken from World Development Indicators.   
The estimates of the determinants of gross secondary school enrollment have  
additional controls to isolate the public good aspect of school enrollment.  Gross secondary 
school enrollment is a product of how much governments spend on education and of how 
they spend the money.  The goods and services that governments buy may or may not be 
public goods.  However, the way governments spend money and the oversight they give to 
spending outcomes are more like public goods and less targetable to specific constituencies.  
The education regressions therefore control for government spending on education in order 
to isolate the impact of years of continuous elections on the public good aspects of school 
policy that influence enrollment.  In addition, gross primary school enrollment is controlled 
for, reflecting the simple fact that secondary school enrollments must drop when primary 
school enrollments are low; at the same time, it controls for the possibility that government 
spending on education might be high, but dedicated disproportionately to primary schools. 
One might argue that government expenditures should be included as a control 
variable directly, since nearly all of the policy variables in the estimates of Tables 2 and 3 are 
related to government expenditure.  In fact, government expenditures as a fraction of GDP 
are associated with significantly lower corruption and higher public investment and school 
enrollment.  Government expenditure is nevertheless excluded from the core specifications 
because its inclusion reduces sample sizes by approximately 25 percent.  Results, though, are 
robust to its inclusion.  Wherever the elections variable is significant in Tables 2 and 3 
below, it remains significant when controlling for government expenditure as a fraction of 
GDP.      16 
In examining the robustness of the results below, a number of other potential 
political characteristics of countries are also examined, including political and electoral 
institutions, ethnic heterogeneity, and voter information.  Table 1 presents a summary of all 
of the variables used here.  Note that each continuous episode of competitive elections 
constitutes an observation.  All variables are therefore averaged over the duration of the 
episode.   
Table 1:  Summary statistics 
Variable  N  Mean  median  std dev. 
Rule of law  101  6.187  6.167  2.48 
Share of government-owned newspapers/ 
market share of  top five newspapers   75  .16  0  .32 
Corruption in government  100  5.89  5  2.25 
Bureaucratic quality  101  5.816  5.39  2.61 
Gross secondary school enrollment  121  62.885  65.32  31.87 
Public investment/GDP  86  0.039  0.032  0.027 
Gov’t. wages/GDP  91  0.061  0.055  .035 
Average continuous years of competitive elections 137  13.35  5.5  17.65 
Ethnolinguistic polarization  128  0.561  0.038  0.72 
Newpaper circulation per 1000 inhabitants  118  119.66  71.99  131.2 
Majoritarian (1) or non-majoritarian  137  0.328  0  0.47 
Presidential (2), Semi-presidential (1),  
or Parliamentary (0)  137  1.096  1.692308  0.95 
Percent population young  133  0.336  0.353  0.1 
Total population (10 millions)  135  33600000  8330978  104000000 
Percent population rural  134  0.487  0.49275  0.22 
Land (millions km2)  133  825394  143000  2190413 
Total government expenditures/GDP  91  0.286  0.28  0.11 
Primary school enrollment  123  99.47  100.7  17.59 
Total education expenditures/GDP  115  0.034  0.032  0.02 
N.B.  Observations are episodes of continuous competitive elections.  Variables are the sum of the   17 
yearly observations divided by the number of years the episode lasts in the sample (a maximum of 26 
years, since the data run from 1975 – 2000).   
Estimation strategy  
The ideal test of the hypothesis that the credibility of pre-electoral political promises 
influences policy would be: 
(1)  Policy choicei = ß0 + ß1(credibility of political competitorsi)+ XiB + ei. 
where i indexes the democratic episode under observation.  Two problems make this 
approach difficult and are the focus of this section.  First, credibility is unobservable.  
Second, credibility is likely to be a function of some of the elements in X, giving rise to 
multicollinearity.   
The previous discussion suggests a close relationship between the number of 
continuous years of competitive elections and credibility, suggesting the elections variable as 
a natural proxy for unobserved credibility.  In particular, because credibility can emerge from 
reputation, and reputation is a possible product of repeated experience with politicians, one 
might expect a positive association between the continuous years of competitive elections 
and the ability of politicians to make credible pre-electoral promises.  Given this, we can 
express credibility as a function of the elections variable, 
(2)    Credibilityi =a 0 +a1(continuous years of competitive elections) + ui..   
Substituting (2) into (1) yields,  
(3)   Policy choicei = ß0 + ß1(a 0 +a 1(continuous years of competitive elections) + ui.)+ XiB + ei.   
Attenuation bias and multicollinearity 
It is always the case that the use of a proxy variable introduces attenuation bias in the 
estimate of the coefficient of the proxied variable.  That is, because the years of continuous 
elections captures the effects of credibility imperfectly, with error u, the estimate of ß1 is 
biased downwards.  The attenuation bias naturally increases the less close is the connection   18 
between credibilityi and the elections variable (the greater is  2
u s ).  It is less often observed, 
however, that attenuation bias worsens in the presence of multicollinearity.  This is a 
particular issue here because of strong associations between credibility and some of the 
elements in X.   
To see this effect, assume that there is only one element in X = x2, set credibility= x1, 
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and note that it is inversely related to Q.   It is evident, then, that the greater is the 







and the greater is attenuation bias (which is zero when  2
u s  is zero).9   
The policy determinant x2 may influence credibility directly or, through its influence 
on the continuous years of competitive elections, indirectly.  Effects are similar in either 
case, but the second case is easiest to demonstrate.  Assume, as is plausible, that the number 
of continuous years of competitive elections is determined by a process like 
i i i i x w z n g g + + = , 2 2 1 , where w is an exogenous and unobserved variable unrelated to 
policy outcomes that influences the elections variable.  But then the process determining 
                                                   
9 See Annex 1 for the full derivation.   19 
credibility, equation (2), can be rewritten as  ( ) i i i i i u x w x + + + = n g g a , 2 2 1 , 1 .  The 
correlation between x1=credibility and x2  is given by  2 ag .  That is, the more that x2 influences 
the continuous years of elections, the greater is the downward bias in the estimation of the 
effect of credibility on policy outcomes when using the elections proxy.   
Three of the control variables included below in X are likely also to influence 
credibility:  the fraction of the population that is rural, the fraction that is young, and income 
per capita.  Not only do they have direct effects on policy, they also are likely to have direct 
and indirect effects (through the continuous years of competitive elections) on credibility.  
Rural voters are more isolated and strategies to improve political credibility with respect to 
these voters, such as personal contact with the voters, are more costly per voter.  This 
directly inhibits the development of credibility.  Younger voters have less experience with 
political actors.  Experience is key to the formation of reputation and credibility, so it is 
more costly for politicians to convey credible promises to them.  Income per capita is also 
likely to have strong effects on credibility.  Politicians can invest resources in making their 
appeals to individual constituents credible, promising private transfers, jobs or assistance in 
times of distress; or they can invest in making their appeals to large groups credible, building 
the credibility of their promises to provide public goods that will benefit large groups in the 
most cost-effective way.  The poorer is a country, the more likely is the first strategy to be 
the most cost-effective way to achieve political support (as Dixit and Londregan 1996 
observe).   
There is substantial evidence for indirect effects.  The years of continuous elections 
is negatively correlated with the percent of the population that is rural    
(r = -0.51) and the percent that is young (r =-.50).  It is positively correlated with income   20 
per capita (r =.71).10  To the extent that rural, young or poorer populations are less well-
served by democracies, they are also less likely to be more passive in the face of efforts to 
overthrow democracy.  For example, if rural voters are more likely to be the captives of 
“patrons”, they would be less likely to benefit from political competition under democracy 
and less opposed to threats to democracy.   
To address attenuation bias and multicollinearity, two strategies are employed.  The 
first is to use instrumental variables.  These are a well-known solution to attenuation bias due 
to measurement error (e.g., if credibility were directly measured, but with error), where the 
instrument is correlated with “true” credibility and uncorrelated with the error term in the 
observed credibility measure.  In the case of proxy variables, as here, the valid instrument 
must be correlated with continuous years of elections, but not with the error term u.   
Multicollinearity of the type suggested here disrupts the efficacy of the IV approach, 
however.  The predicted value of the continuous years of elections, from the first stage of 
the IV estimation, is a function of the instruments for the continuous years of elections and 
the controls X from the second stage of the equation.  However, credibility and the 
continuous years of elections are partially determined by X.  Consequently, the instrument 
will only be valid (significant in the first stage regression of the instrument on continuous 
years of elections) if it has substantial explanatory power above and beyond that of the 
variables in X.  To the extent that these variables are significant determinants of the elections 
variable or of credibility, the instruments will fail.  In fact, as we might expect, the 
                                                   
10 The connection between poverty or agricultural dominance and democratic instability is well-established 
(Przeworski, et al. 2000, Boix and Stokes 2003, Boix 2001).  These relationships are typically explained in terms 
of class conflict, the marginal returns to capital in poor countries and wealth redistribution (see Boix and Stokes 
for a summary).  Unlike this explanation, the argument here takes into account that key aspects of political 
competition (e.g., whether voters are informed or not, or politicians are credible or not) vary systematically 
among democracies and that class-based parties and conflict over wealth distribution are rare in most young 
and poor democracies.     21 
instruments that are widely-used in the cross-country institutions literature are rarely 
significant in the first stage regression in the presence of the variables in X.   
The second strategy used here is therefore to investigate the effects of dropping the 
collinear variables.  The usual criterion to judge the reasonableness of this step is whether 
the resulting increase in precision is large relative to the introduction of an unknown bias 
due to the omission of these variables.  Here, because the collinear variables create a 
significant source of downward bias in the OLS regressions, a stronger case than usual can 
be made that the tradeoff is worthwhile.  In the estimates below, therefore, estimates of (2) 
are therefore undertaken with and without those variables in X for which there is a strong a 
priori case that they influence both credibility and policy choice.  The change in coefficient 
values after dropping these variables is consistent with the a priori argument that the presence 
of the variables X exacerbate the attenuation bias in the OLS regressions and spuriously 
undermine the validity of instruments in the IV regressions.   
Endogeneity 
The IV estimations below address both measurement error and possible endogeneity 
concerns.  These concerns are easy to exaggerate, however.  One might argue, for example, 
that causality is reversed and that policy choice itself drives regime duration.  That is, 
governments that choose bad policies trigger greater opposition than those that do not.  This 
argument alone is not enough to establish that reverse causation drives the results we 
observe.  First, bad policy should lead citizens to prefer challengers to incumbents, but not 
necessarily to prefer autocracy to democracy.  One needs, in addition, an argument that 
suggests why bad policy should lead to regime change.  The credibility arguments here 
provide precisely such an argument:  the less credible are political competitors in a 
democracy, the less acountable they are and the more indifferent citizens should be between   22 
elected and unelected political leaders.  But one cannot use this argument to assert that the 
results below in Table 2 are spurious since this argument and the credibility arguments 
advanced earlier to interpret Table 2 are entirely consistent with each other.   
A different model of reverse causation might assert that an omitted variable is a 
determinant of policy, though not of regime duration, but it is policy that determines the 
number of continuous years of competitive elections.  What might that omitted variable be, 
however?  Policy is the product of government incentives; the latent credibility variable is 
one that explains the pattern of policies observed across democracies.  Again, then, to the 
extent that credibility drives policy choice, it is difficult to argue that reverse causation 
explains the results observed in equation (2).  The literature suggests other possible latent 
influences.  All of these are examined below, however, and found not to explain the 
difference between democracies of different ages.  Finally, in any case, the IV strategy used 
here also addresses potential endogeneity concerns.   
Results 
Public investment, the wage bill of the central government, the rule of law, and 
bureaucratic quality are all approximately one standard deviation higher and secondary 
school enrollment one standard deviation lower in countries where competitive elections 
have been held for fewer than the median number of continuous years.  The market share of 
government-owned newspapers is 32 percent of the market share of the top five newspapers 
in countries with fewer than the median years of continuous competitive elections and close 
to zero in countries with more years.   
These bivariate associations emerge strongly in the regressions in Table 2.  For each 
of the seven policy variables, Table 2 presents two sets of estimates of equation (2).  The 
first is a simple regression controlling for the land area of the country and total population   23 
and, in the equation for secondary school enrollment, controlling as well for education 
spending and primary school enrollment.  The second set of estimates controls, in addition, 
for the three variables likely to have strong effects on government credibility:  the percent of 
the population that is young or rural, and income per capita. 
The pattern of election coefficients across the different policies is exactly consistent 
with the credibility explanation:  rent-seeking falls (recalling that the corruption is worst 
when the corruption variable is lowest) and government provision of public goods (the rule 
of law, bureaucratic quality, the absence of government newspapers and secondary school 
enrollment) rises the more continuous years of competitive elections that countries have 
experienced.  In contrast, government provision of targeted goods – through public 
investment or public employment – falls.  The earlier argument suggests that the 
introduction of the variables percent population that is young or rural and income per capita 
would lead to a drop in the estimate of the elections coefficient.  The second regression in 
each of the regression pairs, demonstrates that this is the case:  in the presence of these three 
variables, the estimates of the elections coefficient, though still highly significant, drop 
substantially in magnitude.11   
The magnitude of the election or credibility effect is in most cases large.  For 
example, in the more parsimonious specifications in Table 2, a one standard deviation 
increase in the continuous years of competitive elections (approximately 20 years) is 
associated with a reduction in corruption of more than one-half a standard deviation, 
increases the rule of law by one-third of a standard deviation and bureaucratic quality by 
                                                   
11 If the three control variables are determinants of political credibility, their signs should be consistent with 
the credibility arguments made earlier.  In all those cases where the estimated coefficients of the variables are 
significant, their signs are consistent with the credibility hypothesis:  corruption is lower, public good provision 
is higher, and fewer targeted goods are provided the greater is income; corruption and the government wage 
bill are higher and some public good provision is lower the younger is the population.     24 
more than one-half a standard deviation, and secondary school enrollment by one-fourth of 
a standard deviation.12   
                                                   
12 Clague, et al. (1996) and Treisman (2000) find that measures of the age of democracy are positively related 
to the rule of law and corruption but do not explain the finding.  The results here and below extend their 
findings in three ways.  First, the results here reflect tests of specific explanations of why age of democracy 
should matter for political incentives to maintain the rule of law or to seek rents – years of election is not 
simply an additional control variable.  Second, the estimates here are based on an objective measure of 
democracy that emphasizes the specific institution of voting rather than broader characterizations of 
democracy.  Finally, the results here are found to be robust to a number of alternative explanations. Table 2:  Effect of the persistence of competitive elections 
(OLS) 
Dependent variable:  Corruption in 
Government 















































































































  .083 
(.16)    .15 
(.00)    .28 
(.00)    .005 
(.47)    .84 
(.06)    .02 




  -7.2 
(.012)    -11.9 
(.00)    -2.12 
(.45)    1.72 
(.003)    -192.4 
(.00)    .13 





  1.11 
(.24)    1.25 
(.23)    1.27 
(.24)    .15 
(.64)    -12.89 
(.14)    .025 




                .44 
(.03) 
.26 
(.004)         
Total education 
expenditures/GDP 
                -91.6 
(.53) 
139.5 
(.11)         
 
R2  .57  .66  .43  .72  .55  .73  .15  .40  .40  .86  .22  .30  .17  .31 
 
N 
99  97  100  98  100  98  74  74  107  107  90  90  86  85 
N.B.  p-values in parentheses.  Each observation is the average across a country-regime, beginning in the first year a country has competitive elections (or 1975) and 
ending in the last year that a country has competitive elections (or 2000).  Robust standard errors are reported, clustered by country so that multiple country-regimes 
from the same country are not treated as independent observations.  All regressions include a constant (not reported).  Instruments in the IV regression marked with * 
do not satisfy the exclusion assumption.Table 3 reports the IV estimates of the regressions in Table 2 using two instruments, 
latitude and British colonial heritage.  These estimates are meant to address both possible 
endogeneity issues and measurement error due to the use of the elections proxy variable.  
With respect to endogeneity, neither instrument is plausibly related to policy choices from 
1975 to 2000, the years over which data are available for the estimations.  With respect to 
measurement error, neither seems plausibly related to the measurement error u that emerges 
from using the elections variable as a proxy for credibility.  At the same time, latitude (or 
geographic location more generally) and colonial experience are likely to capture unobserved 
factors that might influence whether countries become democratic and how long they are 
able to remain democratic. 13    
Recalling the earlier discussion, the strong relationship between years of continuous 
elections, credibility and the controls for the two population variables and income per capita 
mean that no instruments significantly predict the elections variable in the presence of these 
controls. Table 3 results are based on the more parsimonious specifications in Table 2.  In 
every case, the coefficient estimate of the elections variable is larger in the IV estimates in 
Table 3 than in the corresponding estimates in Table 2.  The use of instruments therefore 
seems to reduce attenuation bias due to measurement error, suggesting that measurement 
error – downward bias – rather than endogeneity-driven upward bias is the main concern 
arising from the OLS regressions of Table 2.   
                                                   
13 These are two of several variables that are standard in the literature linking cross country outcomes to 
institutional variables.  Others (such as settler mortality, fraction of English speakers, years since independence) 
fail as instruments because they are insignificant determinants of the continuous years of competitive elections. Table 3:  Effect of the persistence of competitive elections – Two-stage least squares 

































































enrollment          .49 
(.002)      
Total education 
expenditures/GDP          63.6 
(.73)      
R2  .94  .92  .92  .34  .88  .83  .73 
N  95  96  96  65  96  79  78 
F-test on instruments 
in first stage  12.92  12.35  12.35  10.32  14.62  15.51  15.48 
Hansen’s J-test of 
hypothesis that 
instruments can be 
excluded from second 
stage 
(p-value) 
.08  .37  .57  .91  .93  .002  .006 
N.B.  p-values in parentheses.  Each observation is the average across a country-regime, beginning in the first year a country has competitive elections (or 1975) and 
ending in the last year that a country has competitive elections (or 2000).  Robust standard errors are reported, clustered by country so that multiple country-regimes 
from the same country are not treated as independent observations.  All regressions include a constant (not reported).  The validity of the IV estimates depends on whether the instruments predict the 
elections variable and whether they can be legitimately excluded from the set of X variables 
thought to determine policy.  With regard to the first, the F-test roundly rejects the null 
hypothesis that the instruments provide no explanatory power in the first stage equation; the 
F-statistic is in every case quite large.  In four of the seven cases, the J-test also rejects the 
hypothesis that the instruments should not be excluded from the second stage regression.  
The IV results of Table 3 therefore provide strong evidence in four of the seven cases that 
downward bias in the credibility/elections coefficient due to measurement error is the 
primary problem in the estimates of Table 2 and that signifcant results are not due to 
endogeneity driven by reverse causation or omitted variables.   
In the other three cases, the IV results are suggestive that endogeneity is not an issue, 
though not conclusive.  However, the analyses in the sections that follow introduce a series 
of additional political and other variables into the estimations.  The main results do not 
change, providing further evidence that Table 2 results are not driven by the omission of key 
variables.   
Other influences on political incentives:  polarization and political institutions  
The results in Tables 2 and 3 provide substantial evidence of a relationship between 
the continuous years of competitive elections and policy outcomes.  This relationship is 
exactly consistent with what one would expect if the underlying problem of younger 
democracies is the unobserved difficulty that political competitors have in making credible 
promises.  However, younger and older democracies differ for other reasons.  It is possible 
that these other reasons, ranging from political institutions and social polarization to citizen   29 
information, are driving the results obtained so far.14  In this and the following sections, two 
arguments are made.  First, as a theoretical matter, only credibility differences between 
young and older democracies are predicted to have the policy effects observed here.  Second, 
empirically, the evidence suggests that these other political and social variables do not 
account for the effects of the elections variable on policy outcomes.   
One of these variables is polarization.  Voter polarization might increase or decrease 
public good spending and corruption, however.  Effects are contingent on the number of 
polarized groups and electoral institutions.  Voters who are highly polarized on ideological 
dimensions might give very little weight to the policy promises or performance of 
candidates, allowing ideologically preferred candidates to increase rent-seeking and reduce 
provision of public services without suffering an electoral penalty, predictions identical to 
the credibility model outlined earlier.  Alternatively, as Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 
8) show, polarization might lead to reduced rent-seeking, lower public good provision and 
higher targeted good provision.15  These predictions stand in sharp contrast to the credibility 
model.   
In the analysis below, ethnolinguistic fractionalization (the probability that two 
randomly selected people are not from the same ethnic or linguistic group) is transformed to 
reflect more closely the concept of social polarization.  As in Keefer and Knack (2002), the 
                                                   
14 See Keefer and Khemani (2003) for a review of these findings. 
15 They assume three groups of voters.  Voters from one group prefer on average one party independent of 
the policies advocated by the party; voters from a second group prefer the other party; voters from the third 
are on average indifferent.  By construction, the polarization of the first two groups falls as within-group 
heterogeneity increases.  As polarization falls (heterogeneity increases) relative to the middle group of swing 
voters, governments loser fewer votes from the more extreme groups when they transfer resources from public 
good provision to targeted goods benefiting only the swing group.  Transfers therefore rise, but rent-seeking 
falls, since increased competition for the support of swing voters forces politicians to give up rent-seeking.  
With other preference distributions, however, other outcomes are possible.  For example, if 51 percent of 
voters have a strong ideological predisposition towards one party, and 49 percent are strongly disposed against 
the party, the 51 percent will be reluctant to remove “their” party even if rent-seeking is rampant.   In 
majoritarian electoral systems, polarization has no effect, since competitors care only about swing voters under 
all ideological distributions.       30 
highest values of social polarization are assigned to countries in which individuals have 
approximately a 50 percent chance of encountering someone from the same ethnolinguistic 
group and the lowest values when they have either a very high chance or very low chance of 
encountering someone from the same ethnolinguistic group.  The theory suggests that it is 
this middle range of fractionalization in which societies are likely to be most polarized, since 
two large and evenly matched groups are more likely to generate conflict than many small 
groups or one large group.  Ethnic polarization, so defined, is about one half a standard 
deviation higher in countries with fewer than the median number of years of continuous 
elections.   
The institutional literature also offers powerful explanations for variations in 
performance across democracies.  Persson and Tabellini (2000) examine the effect of 
changes in numerous electoral and political institutions on government spending decisions, 
particularly the provision of public goods, transfers to narrow constituencies, and rent-
seeking.  Of greatest interest here, they show that electoral institutions – whether elections 
are first past the post or proportional, whether district magnitudes are large or small – have a 
significant impact on these decisions.  However, the direction of the institutional effect 
depends heavily on the specification of the model and on whether one cares about local 
public goods or national public goods.16   
Electoral rules and political systems are also predicted in the literature to have 
systematic effects on government policy making, though not necessarily in directions that 
explain the outcomes here.  Majoritarian voting systems might encourage an intense focus 
                                                   
16 If pre-electoral promises are credible, swing districts receive disproportionate attention in majoritarian 
systems.  Targeted transfers are therefore higher and public good provision lower, as in the low credibility 
model, but unlike the low credibility case, rents are also lower under majoritarian systems.  If promises are not 
credible, and politicians can do nothing to increase their credibility, transfers play no role in voter decision 
making and they go to zero in all electoral systems, proportional or majoritarian.  Rents, though, are higher 
under majoritarian electoral rules.   31 
on transfers to narrow constituencies (swing districts), which would also reduce corruption; 
presidential systems might encourage low corruption, but also low public good spending (see 
Persson and Tabellini 2000).  Using information from the DPI, countries are coded as 
majoritarian if they have plurality electoral rules and the median district magnitude is less than 
three, following Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003).  The political systems of countries – 
whether they are parliamentary or presidential – is determined based on the system variable 
from the DPI.  Countries with more years of continuous elections are approximately 50 
percent more likely to be parliamentary democracies with proportional representation 
electoral rules.  Majoritarian rules by themselves are not, however, correlated with the 
continuous years of competitive elections.    
Table 4:  Alternative explanations for the performance of young democracies 
N.B.  p-values in parentheses.  Control variables are the same as in Table 2, but, along with constants, are not reported.  Each observation is the average across a country-regime, 
beginning in the first year a country has competitive elections (or 1975) and ending in the last year that a country has competitive elections (or 2000).  Robust standard errors are 
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2  .64  .57  .62    .60  .24  .18 
N  96  96  96    103  85  80 Table 4 regressions show that none of these variables accounts for the difference in 
performance between younger and older democracies.  The table reports two sets of 
regressions.  Each uses as a base the more parsimonious of each pair of specifications in 
Table 2.  The first set of regressions in Table 4 controls, simultaneously, for polarization, 
whether countries have majoritarian electoral systems, and whether they have parliamentary 
political systems.  The second set, discussed in the section below, evaluates the effect of 
newspaper circulation (voter information).  If the estimates of the election coefficients in 
Table 2 are driven by the omission of any of these variables, the elections coefficient in 
Table 4 should be small and insignificant.   
In fact, although they in general differ systematically between younger and older 
democracies, ethno-linguistic polarization and political and electoral institutions do not 
explain the pattern of policies preferred by countries with fewer years of continuous 
elections.  The elections variable remains significant, with approximately the same magnitude 
as in Table 2, even after inclusion of the polarization and institutional variables.  Ethnic 
polarization is associated with less government involvement in newspapers and public 
investment, but also less gross secondary school enrollment, this last consistent with findings 
on public good spending in Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999).  Majoritarian electoral laws 
and parliamentary systems are associated with higher corruption (recalling that higher values 
of the corruption variable imply more integrity and less corruption), in contrast to Persson, 
Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) but majoritarian systems are associated as well with larger 
secondary school enrollments.  Parliamentary, non-majoritarian systems also exhibit less 
government involvement in newspapers.   34 
Other influences on political incentives:  voter information 
Limited voter information about politician types or actions also creates distortions in 
the policy making process.  This section explores whether voter information, rather than 
credibility, explains the elections results in Table 2.  The test turns out to be far from 
straightforward, however, since a strong argument can be made that the standard proxy for 
citizen information, newspaper circulation, is itself heavily influenced by government policies 
that are determined by the credibility of government promises, such as government 
ownership of newspapers.   
Grossman and Helpman (1996) predict that the larger the fraction of voters who are 
uninformed about the preferred policy stance of politicians, the greater are political 
incentives to collect resources from special interests in return for favors in order to “inform” 
these voters.  Since younger democracies are likely to have fewer informed voters, models in 
this vein predict that young democracies are more likely to exhibit policies benefiting narrow 
rather than broad interests.  Besley and Burgess focus on the tradeoff between providing 
private transfers to voters and rent-seeking by politicians.  Their analysis predicts that 
politicians will shirk less (engage in less rent-seeking) and channel more state resources to 
citizens in the form of transfers when media exposure and voter turnout are greater.  These 
analyses do not address whether better-informed citizens would encourage politicians to 
channel resources to public good provision at the expense of private goods, however.  That 
is, it is not yet clear how voter information influences the incentives of politicians to appeal 
to narrow versus broad segments of society.   
Newspaper circulation is the most-used proxy for voter information, one that is 
relevant in the discussion of the behavior of young democracies.  It is three times greater in 
countries where elections have occurred for more than 19 continuous years than in countries   35 
where they have occurred for fewer.  Besley and Burgess find that greater circulation of 
vernacular newspapers leads governments to make larger transfers to citizens affected by 
food shortages.17  Adserá, et al. (2003) and others also find that in cross-country 
comparisons, newspaper circulation per 1000 population, from World Development Indicators, is 
significantly associated with lower corruption.  Taken together, the literature provides 
support for the notion that voter information – rather than political credibility – might 
explain the policy performance of young democracies. 
Newspaper circulation appears to be highly vulnerable to government policy 
intervention.  Using data from Djankov, et al. (2003), one finds that a 40 percent increase 
(one standard deviation) in the market share of state-owned newspapers as a fraction of the 
market share of the top five newspapers is associated with a reduction in newspaper 
circulation by 0.4 standard deviations.  It is likely that newspaper circulation may itself be a 
proxy for both unobserved political credibility and unobserved citizen information, making it 
difficult to interpret the estimated effects of newspaper circulation on policy.   
Despite this ambiguity, the lower set of regressions in Table 4 adds newspaper 
circulation to the basic regression specification of Table 2, across all policy areas but the 
market share of government newspapers.  The elections variable remains significant in all 
but two cases when newspaper circulation is included, despite the likely association of 
newspaper circulation and the credibility of political actors.  Further supporting the 
argument that newspaper circulation is related to credibility, newspaper circulation is itself 
associated with lower corruption, higher public good provision (rule of law, bureaucratic 
                                                   
17 Strömberg considers a similar information problem, but assumes that credible pre-electoral promises can be 
made, and shows that households with radios were more likely to receive transfers from a particular US 
government program during the Great Depression.     36 
quality, secondary school enrollment), and lower transfers to targeted groups (public 
investment and government employment).    
Other influences on political incentives:  leader effects  
Although the results in Table 2 are robust to a variety of specifications, including 
controls for alternative political determinants of policy, the somewhat generous definition of 
competitive elections used here (multiple parties competing with no party receiving more 
than 75 percent of the vote) might encompass countries in which a single leader has survived 
in office for considerable periods of time.  The elections variable might therefore conflate 
the years of continuous competitive elections with leader effects – the years that an 
individual leader has been in office.  These leader effects can be significant, though their 
predicted direction is ambiguous.  This section documents that the results on the continuous 
years of competitive elections in Tables 2 and 3 are robust to controlling for the average 
tenure of the executive in each democratic period.   
Przeworski, et al. (2000) argue that elected leaders cannot be assumed to be 
democratically accountable until a democratic transition from one party to another has 
occurred.  The definition of democracy used here, which counts democratic duration from 
the very first election, may therefore conflate the effects of credibility with the proven ability 
of older democracies to expel entrenched leaders.  On the other hand, Clague, et al. (1996) 
and others have emphasized that long-surviving autocrats are associated with more secure 
property rights.  It is not clear whether this logic carries through to the experience of long-
surviving elected executives.  To the extent that it does, the elections variable in Tables 2 and 
3 may actually be capturing the policy effects of leaders who expect to remain in office 
longer.    37 
The omission of the average tenure of leaders may also generate other biases.  For 
example, efforts by elected leaders to suppress political competition through vote fraud, the 
unbridled use of public funds for political purposes, or through outright legal restrictions on 
potential challengers, are difficult to observe but potentially influence both the elections 
variable and policy outcomes.  Annex 2 provides evidence of close links between the years 
of competitive elections and the average tenure of elected leaders.  Controls for the average 
tenure of leaders should effectively capture much of these unobserved anti-democratic 
political tactics.   
Although there are numerous arguments to suggest that unobserved leader effects 
might bias the elections variable used above, none of these are borne out in practice.  A 
variable controlling for the tenure of individual leaders, the average years in office of the 
chief executive over the democratic episode in question (from the Database of Political 
Institutions) was included in all of the specifications in Tables 2 and 3 .  In every case, the 
estimated coefficient of the elections variable was highly robust.  These results are not 
reported since, for most of the policies under consideration, the average years in office of 
the executive is insignificant.18   
Conclusion  
The number of continuous years of competitive elections has a significant impact on 
seven policy areas widely identified as key to economic development.  Only one explanation 
for this finds support in the foregoing tests:  where political competitors are less able to 
make credible promises to voters, policies are distorted in the same fashion that we observe 
when we compare policy choices across younger and older democracies.  Patron-client 
relationships in society are transported to the political realm with greater facility in such an 
                                                   
18 Years in office significantly increases the market share of government newspapers, as well as the rule of law 
and bureaucratic quality in two specifications, but is otherwise insignificant.     38 
environment, generating high transfers, high rent-seeking, and low levels of public good 
provision.  
This argument ties together elements of a diverse body of research examining 
clientelism, the performance of young democracies and the importance of democratic 
institutions for key public policy outcomes.  Huntington (1971) has famously argued that 
political systems are unstable when political participation advances more rapidly than 
political institutionalization.  These broad relationships are not easy to test, or even to define.  
For example, Huntington suggests that systems are more highly institutionalized when they 
are “more adaptable, complex, coherent and autonomous” (1971, p. 315).  Shefter (1994) 
uses a more concrete notion of institutionalization – whether a well-functioning state 
apparatus exists – and argues that when elections precede the development of such an 
apparatus, clientelism (manifested as patronage) is more likely to emerge.  These analyses do 
not address the question of the conditions under which such an apparatus emerges, why they 
should change voter and politician behavior, nor what specific policy distortions we should 
expect to see in less institutionalized states.  The logic in this paper helps to fill in these gaps 
by documenting the relationships among political credibility, clientelism, the continuous 
years of competitive elections and government policy decisions.   
The view of institutionalization developed here helps to explain other puzzles 
thrown up by the literature.  Clague, et al. (1996), for example, show that the age of 
democracies has a significant impact on the security of property rights, but do not explain 
why leaders of younger democracies would be systematically less willing to defend the 
security of property rights.19  Treisman(2000) and Adserà (2003) both find that democracy, 
                                                   
19 Their argument is one of reverse causation:  democracies fail when democratic leaders do not protect 
property rights.  The empirical evidence in Table 3 suggests that there is also a substantial effect in the other 
direction, from the age of democracy to the protection of property rights.     39 
per se, has no robust effect on corruption.  Treisman finds that only long-lived democracies 
exhibit less corruption than other countries.  In addition to expanding on such findings, this 
paper offers another explanation for them.   
Further work is needed to clarify the effects of political credibility on government 
decision making, however.  For example, how does political credibility affect the relationship 
between political and electoral institutions and government decisions?  Further evidence is 
needed, as well, that tests the credibility hypothesis directly and that investigates the complex 
relationship among credibility, the persistence of democracy, and such variables as income 
and the age of the population and its urban-rural distribution.     40 
Annex 1:  Multicollinearity exacerbates attenuation bias 
To see that multicollinearity can exacerbate downward bias due to the attenuation 
effect, assume that policy, y is influenced only by credibility, x1, which is unobserved, and a 
second observable variable, x2.  Assume that credibility is only a function of the observable 
continuous years of competitive elections, z, and that constants are suppressed.  That is: 
1)  i i i i x x y e b b + + = , 2 2 , 1 1  
2)  i i i u z x + = a , 1  
so that we estimate 
3)  ( ) i i i i i i i i i u x z x u z y e b b a b e b a b + + + = + + + = 1 , 2 2 1 , 2 2 1  
The estimated coefficients of b1 = b1 and b2 = b2  are given by[ ] [ ] [ ] xy xx S S b
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The first row of this expression is the solution for b1.  Multiplying through, noting 
that x1, x2, u and e  are independent of each other, and simplifying, we get b1 = 
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Simplifying D, and dividing numerator and denominator 
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As usual, attenuation arises because the continuous years of elections is not a perfect 
indicator of credibility, captured in (4) by the term 2
u s .  Where  2
u s  is zero, there is no 
attenuation bias.  The larger is the effect of the variance of the error in equation (3), the 
greater is the attenuation effect. This in turn means that the smaller is Q, the larger is the 
attenuation effect.  It is straightforward to see that the higher the correlation between x1 and 
x2, the smaller is Q.   







, 1 , 2
, 2 , 1
.  The larger is 
the numerator, the higher is the correlation, the higher is the second term in Q, 
( )
2
, 2 , 1 i ix x ￿ , and the lower is Q.  Similarly, the lower is the denominator, the higher is the 
correlation, the lower is the first term in Q, and again, the lower is Q.  That is, the more 
highly correlated is unobserved credibility with the second determinant of policy outcomes,   42 
the more that the coefficient estimate of the effect of credibility, derived from the use of the 
proxy variable continuous years of elections, is biased downwards.   
This correlation could be high for a number of reasons.  One that is straightforward 
to identify and is evident in the data is the following.  The continuous years of elections in a 
country is not entirely exogenous.  In fact, it is likely to be influenced by the same variables, 
such as x2, that influence policy.  That is, it is likely to emerge from a process something like: 
5)  i i i x w z n g g + + = 2 2 1  
We can then rewrite (2) as  ( ) i i i i u x w x + + + = n g g a 2 2 1 , 1  and note immediately that the 
correlation between credibility and x2 is given by  2 ag .  The more that x2 influences the 
continuous years of elections, the greater is the downward bias in the estimation of the effect 
of credibility on policy outcomes when using the elections proxy.   
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Annex 2:  Leader tenure and the duration of democracy 
It is clear that elected leaders who succesfully pursue unobservable, undemocratic 
efforts to drive out competitors would be less accountable and, therefore, more likely to 
engage in corruption and less inclined to provide broad-based public goods.  Substantial 
evidence also indicates that leader tenure truncates the continuous periods of competitive 
elections.  If elected leaders are successful in suppressing competition, they eventually win 
more than 75 percent of the vote and drop out of the “competitive elections” category that 
defines the elections variable.  Alternatively, leaders who suppress electoral competition 
encourage non-electoral competition, increasing the likelihood that unelected leaders will 
replace them.  Again, the country is dropped from the “competitive elections” category. 
In the DPI, there are 36 episodes in which countries leave the most competitive 
electoral category.  In all 36 cases, the average tenure of incumbents prior to the change in 
electoral competitiveness is higher than average:  7.3 years, compared to 4.3 years for all 
country-years during periods of continuous competitive elections.  In addition, the majority 
party controlled 66 percent of the seats in the legislature on average, compared to 58 
percent, on average, among all countries in the “most competitive” category. 
In fourteen of the 36 cases, the government remained in power, continued to hold 
somewhat less competitive elections (in which multiple parties competed, but the 
government party received more than 75 percent of the vote) and simply accumulated a 
more dominant political position.  In these cases, the government majority in the legislature 
rose to 77 percent, on average.  In 13 of the 22 cases in which the incumbent lost power, on 
the other hand, the new government took control extra-institutionally and not even sham 
elections were held.  (Following the DPI coding of LIEC and EIEC, the group of 19 
countries fell from scores of 7 on LIEC or EIEC  to 6, while the 13 countries that   44 
abandoned elections fell from 7 to 2.)  This evolution is precisely what one would expect 
control of government to change in countries in which the incumbency advantage is large. 
There are numerous examples of the following kind that illustrate the more statistical 
findings.  The former President of Perú, Alberto Fujimori, entered office having gathered 
approximately 25 percent of the first round votes in 1990.  It is well-known that he enjoyed 
increasing public support, even after dissolving the legislature and firing most judges in 1992, 
and that he captured about 65 percent of the vote in 1995, against the former General 
Secretary of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuellar.  Less known is that, once in office, 
Fujimori was aggressive about personally inaugurating small projeccts around the country.   
and nearly immediately, he began to assiduously cultivated voters who had scant knowledge 
of him by personally inaugurating small, narrowly targeted public works projects in their 
villages, using such well-financed programs rolled by the President’s Office, such as 
FONCODES.    45 
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